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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44034 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2013-21164 
v.     ) 
     ) 
CLIFFORD DANIEL SINGER, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Clifford Singer contends the district court abused its discretion when it revoked 
his probation and executed his sentence in this case.  Specifically, he asserts the 
mitigating factors reveal that he had been making strides toward rehabilitation, and so, 
despite the recent violations of the terms of probation, he should be allowed to continue 
his rehabilitative efforts on probation.  As such, this Court should reverse the order 
revoking probation and order Mr. Singer be returned to probation. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Singer was initially found guilty of burglary by a jury.  (R., p.116.)  The 
presentence investigation (hereinafter, PSI) indicated that, despite being 64 years old, 
he only had one prior felony conviction, and six prior misdemeanor convictions.  
(PSI, pp.18-19.)  The GAIN-I evaluation concluded that Mr. Singer suffers from alcohol 
dependence and bipolar disorder.  (PSI, pp.25-26.)  However, his alcohol dependence 
did not satisfy the criteria for substance abuse treatment.  (PSI, p.32.)  Rather, it 
indicated Mr. Singer’s treatment should focus on helping him continue to address his 
mental health issues.  (See, e.g., PSI, p.29 (reporting Mr. Singer “appears stable for 
treatment” for his mental health issues); see also PSI, p.33 (2008 mental health 
treatment discharge diagnosis report which noted, at that point, Mr. Singer had been 
able to stabilize his bipolar disorder).)  Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, which it suspended for a 
two-year period of probation.1  (R., pp.130-31.) 
 Mr. Singer was ordered to complete the mental health court program as a term of 
his probation.  (R., p.136.)  However, he was absent from the program for several 
weeks due to medical issues.  (See R., pp.182-86.)  The record is not clear as to what 
those medical issues were, but it does reveal he was under treatment in the Veteran’s 
Administration hospital, followed by a period of treatment at an assisted nursing facility.  
(See R., pp.182-86.)  The district court initially ordered a two-year extension of the term 
                                            
1 Mr. Singer filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., p.141.)  
In that appeal, he asserted there had been insufficient evidence to convict him, but the 
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion.  State v. Singer, 
2015 WL 5579681 (Ct. App. 2015).   
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of Mr. Singer’s probation so that he would have additional time to complete the mental 
health court program, but ultimately, it ordered he receive a medical discharge from the 
program.  (R., pp.184, 186.)  Subsequently, Mr. Singer admitted a violation of the terms 
of his probation related to drinking alcohol.  (R., p.197.)  Both the State and Mr. Singer 
recommended the district court impose some jail time, then return Mr. Singer to 
probation and the mental health court.  (R., p.197.)  The district court did so, extending 
Mr. Singer’s term of probation through May 2018.  (R., p.196.)  However, Mr. Singer 
remained incarcerated because it was taking additional time to secure housing for him.  
(See R., p.225.)  During that period of incarceration, he struggled with his mental health 
medication, and ultimately, was placed on suicide watch.  (R., p.225.)  As a result, his 
release order was rescinded.  (R., p.227.)  Ultimately, though, he was released on 
probation.  (R., p.233.)   
 However, Mr. Singer continued to struggle during that period of release, and, 
within a month, he was terminated from the mental health court program.  (See 
R., p.237.)  At an ensuing probation violation hearing, the district court indicated the 
reasons for terminating Mr. Singer from the mental health court program were his 
behavior at a mental health court hearing the week before,2 alleged disrespect to the 
staff and residents of Harmony House where Mr. Singer had been living, and alleged 
threats to kill family members.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.20 - p.5, L.13.)  Mr. Singer denied the 
allegations, particularly the second and third allegations.  (Tr., p.12, L.25 - p.13, L.3.)   
                                            
2 A transcript of the mental health court hearing in question was ordered to be 
augmented to the record.  (Order Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule, dated August 30, 2016.)  References to that transcript will be 
identified as “Supp. Tr.” 
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However, the district court explained that the first allegation alone provided 
sufficient grounds for termination from the program.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-4, 11-14.)  
Specifically, that allegation was related to Mr. Singer’s making several assertions about 
the way his probation officer had handled his case, including an allegation that the 
probation officer had sent paperwork misidentifying Mr. Singer as a sex offender when 
he had ordered Mr. Singer to serve some jail time, and Mr. Singer stated that resulted in 
him being raped during the period of incarceration.  (Supp. Tr., p.3, Ls.13-25.)  After 
Mr. Singer’s statements, the district court decided that continuing the mental health 
court proceedings would not be productive, and it ordered Mr. Singer into custody for 
one week.  (Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.3-4.)  However, after Mr. Singer made another 
disrespectful comment (which was apparently directed at his probation officer) (see 
Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.8-9), the district court suggested Mr. Singer might face a longer period 
of incarceration or termination from the mental health court program.  (Supp. Tr., p.4, 
Ls.4-11.) 
Mr. Singer acknowledged that, despite denying the underlying allegations which 
had resulted in his termination from drug court, he had, in fact, been terminated from 
mental health court, and as such, had violated the terms of his probation.  (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.3-5.)  Nevertheless, he requested the district court continue him on probation, allow 
him to continue working with the programs at Harmony House because “the best he’s 
done in the last twenty years was the period of time he was in the Harmony House.”  
(Tr., p.12, Ls.19-20, p.13, Ls.6-10.)  The district court refused to do so, concluding 
Mr. Singer represented a threat to the community if he remained on probation.  
(Tr., p.24, Ls.5-7.)  As a result, it revoked Mr. Singer’s probation and executed his 
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underlying sentence.  (R., pp.242-43.)  Mr. Singer filed a Notice of Appeal timely from 
the order revoking his probation.  (R., pp.245-47.) 
 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Singer’s probation and 
executing his underlying sentence. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Singer’s Probation And 
Executing His Underlying Sentence 
 
The decision to revoke probation is one within the district court’s discretion.  
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000).  The district court must determine 
“whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of 
the probation is consistent with the protection of society.”  Id. The Legislature has 
established the criteria for determining whether probation or incarceration is merited.  
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing I.C. § 19-2521).   
Mr. Singer explained that, during his most recent period of probation, he had 
been able to make progress in his rehabilitative efforts and he was in the best place he 
had been in twenty years.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.19-22.)  This is important because it is 
indicative of Mr. Singer’s growing ability to deal with issues, such as his bipolar disorder, 
during recent years.  (See, e.g., PSI, pp.33-37.)  However, that improvement has been 
a process, and during that process, he has experienced some ups and downs.  For 
instance, there was a down period during Mr. Singer’s initial period of probation when 
he was unable to participate in the mental health court program due to medical issues, 
and that ultimately resulted in his removal from the mental health court program. (See 
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R., pp.182-86.)  He continued to struggle with his mental health issues when he was 
subsequently returned to custody.  (See R., pp.225, 227, 233.)  Nevertheless, the 
district court returned Mr. Singer to probation to allow him to continue working in the 
mental health court program.  (R., p.197.)   
The instant violation shows a similar pattern.  While Mr. Singer may have 
experienced one of his down periods during his most recent period of probation (see 
generally Supp. Br.), it only occurred a month into that program.  Thus, given 
Mr. Singer’s overall upward trend toward rehabilitation (see, e.g., Tr., p.12, Ls.19-22), 
this most recent down period does not indicate that probation had not been, or would 
not continue to be, the best way to achieve the goal of rehabilitation.  Since probation 
has been achieving the goal of rehabilitation in Mr. Singer’s case, he should have been 
continued on probation.  See, e.g., Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312.  This is true despite the 
district court’s concerns about the threat he presented to the community (see Tr., p.24, 
Ls.5-7) because Mr. Singer’s continued rehabilitation would be the most effective way to 
reduce that risk.  Thus, the district court’s decision to revoke probation within a month of 
Mr. Singer’s most recent release indicates it did not sufficiently consider these factors, 
and so, abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Singer’s probation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Singer respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking his 
probation and order he be released back onto probation. 
 DATED this 28th day of September, 2016. 
      _________/s/________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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